Thursday, 9 May 2013

Cats, Dogs and People in the Imperialist World Economy

Here is a selection of facts to ponder, sent to me today by a friend. They indicate how it is better to be a cat or a dog in an imperialist economic power than a worker in an oppressed country.

This is another angle on the Bangladesh textile factory atrocity that was recently in the news, something which gave a dramatic example of the human cost of exploitation that goes beyond the figures for wages that I covered in the article 'What the "China Price" Really Means' on 3 June 2011, when analysing how much of the value produced in poor countries finds its way into the consumer lifestyles of the rich.

You should probably sit down before you read this, although the information does not contradict what everyone knows is true:

The UK spends £14.9 billion a year on pet care – an average of around £11 per pet each week – of which pet food is estimated at £2.7bn.

People in the West spend £11 billion a year on ringtones for their mobile phones.

The average monthly wage of a Bangladeshi textile worker is £29.

Bangladesh State annual spending on education $11 per capita.

Mintel Industry Report on the UK retail sector
 
Pet Food and Supplies - UK - March 2011

* UK consumers are heavily invested in the pet care market. Their personal lifestyle, health and hygiene expectations are being transferred to pets, and the market is only too happy to cater to this demand.

* Weight control is becoming as relevant to pets as it is to humans with a third of dogs and a quarter of cats considered to be overweight. The growing awareness of pet obesity has prompted a number of targeted initiatives and also provides further opportunities for specific diet foods for certain breeds and ages.

* Pet treat brands can continue to add value to the category by refocusing on the less mature and relatively underdeveloped cat treat market at the expense of dog treats.

* Another way in which brands can continue to grow sales is by tapping into the trend towards pet parenting, with 70% of pet owners treating their pets with as much care as they would a child, with products such as greetings cards and other gifts.


Tony Norfield, 9 May 2013

Monday, 22 April 2013

Reflections on Reinhart & Rogoff



It turns out that there is no slump in economic output once government debt rises above 90% of GDP – the case for austerity has been blown apart! That is the conclusion of people who have joined the attack on a widely cited piece of research by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, from the economics editor of the Financial Times, the head of PIMCO, one of the world’s largest investment funds, and many others.

Reinhart and Rogoff’s thesis was that higher government debt, above a trigger level of 90%, would produce much lower growth, so that more government spending to escape recession would backfire.[1] A recent academic paper showed that, among other things, they had miscalculated some of the numbers underpinning the result.[2] The authors admit the miscalculation error, but argue that their broad conclusions remain valid. What should we make of this policy spat?

A debate over econometrics, of all things, has risen to such prominence because austerity is under way in many countries. Opponents of these policies want to show it is unnecessary: there is an alternative; a Thatcherite ‘no alternative’ should have been buried with the rusting Iron Lady last week.

But consider an issue of principle. What if the data, properly assessed, had indeed shown that more government spending – leading, at least in the short-term, to more government debt – was bad for growth? After all, other studies, not simply Reinhart and Rogoff’s, have made the point that high levels of all kinds of debt are associated with weaker growth.[3] Does that mean that austerity can now be an acceptable policy? This indicates the narrow terms of such a debate; one that takes for granted that what is good for the health of the capitalist economy is good for humanity, give or take a bit of redistribution. Not surprisingly, none of the opponents to Reinhart and Rogoff argued that capitalism is a reactionary system whose imperatives should be rejected.

It is difficult to express quite how stupid the usual debate is when the capitalist system is faced with its most serious economic crisis. However, what underlies the common critical view of capitalist policy is not concern with the depredations visited upon the victims of imperialism, but the growing realisation that the cost of the system is now also to be borne by (most of) the inhabitants of the imperialist powers.

The problem they face is that the rationale for government spending cuts as part of a policy to reduce debt and restore conditions of profitable accumulation does make some sense. After all, more or less everything else has already been tried in the major capitalist powers, and to no lasting effect. We have seen a dramatic rise in government spending, including taking on the liabilities of a blown out financial system that was the main source of the previous ‘prosperity’, close-to-zero interest rates at which banks can borrow from the central bank and extraordinary measures of ‘quantitative easing’, including the latest gambit from the Bank of Japan.

To presume that austerity is being introduced as a mistaken policy measure ignores the unwelcome fact that there are basically no alternative policies left. Yes, austerity will bring economic pain and destruction, and (hopefully) political turmoil too, but that is the nature of the beast. Unless that nature is understood, the beast will not be overcome. The most that advocating ‘alternative policies’ rather than a wholehearted opposition will do is delay the beast’s bloody meal of its opponents from breakfast until lunchtime.


Tony Norfield, 22 April 2013


[1] Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, ‘Growth in a Time of Debt’, NBER Working Paper 15639, January 2010.
[3] See Stephen G Cecchetti et al, ‘The Real Effects of Debt’, August 2011, on the BIS website at http://www.bis.org/publ/othp16.htm Also see the articles on this blog: ‘Debt and Austerity’, 8 August 2011 and ‘Capitalist Crisis, Keynesian Delusions’, 5 September 2011.

Friday, 22 March 2013

UK Foreign Direct Investment Profits


The table below is an update of some figures shown in the first article on this blog, 'The Economics of British Imperialism' in May 2011. That article covered the broad mechanism in play, something I am still researching, particularly its financial aspects. This table only refers to one dimension of the total picture, but an interesting one nevertheless. It shows the profit rates of outward UK direct investment, in total and by geographical region, including some key countries.

Profit rates are calculated by measuring company earnings divided by the average value of share capital and reserves owned by UK companies in that year and the previous one. The same pattern of profit rates applies for these numbers that go up to end-2011 as the for the ones to end-2009 in the 2011 article: the bulk of FDI assets are located in the richer countries, but a much higher profit rate is gained from the poorer countries. There are exceptions, especially for UK investment (largely in mining operations) in Australia. However, the overall divergence is clear. Africa, Asia (including the Middle East in these data) and Brazil stand out as sources of huge premium investment returns compared to other locations. The India numbers probably explain UK Prime Minister Cameron's visit last month to India, together with representatives of more than 100 British companies.

It seems odd that there would be such a divergence in profit rates. After all, if a higher profit rate is available elsewhere, then why does not more capital migrate to that country, rather than stay in one of the richer countries? This raises bigger issues about the monopolistic structure of the world market, whether there is much of a process of equalising rates of profit in the world economy, and whether having a presence in major, rich markets is necessary from the perspective of maintaining commercial control of major consumer markets, even if it turns out not to be directly profitable. Or, alternatively the data may just be rubbish, hiding the real locations of company operations and/or giving the wrong view of the returns on investment! One obvious problem here is that companies can relatively easily relocate the location of their profits to countries with lower tax rates, whether by charging 'licence fees' to a pretend headquarters in a tax haven, or by some other means of transfer pricing.

John Smith, cited elsewhere on this blog, has argued correctly that one should distinguish FDI by its type: where is the productive FDI capital located, as opposed to the commercial or financial capital, or other unproductive operations? In addition, what may appear to be productive capital might be getting most of its 'value added' from cheap supplies from poor countries. UK FDI data suggest that most productive UK FDI is located in rich countries, but these are regional figures with little country breakdown, something that is omitted to secure individual company information, but which only adds to scepticism about what the data actually reflect. In any case, such data cannot take into account the benefits to major companies of their links with foreign suppliers that they dominate in so-called value-chains.

This is a complex topic that is hard to resolve with official statistics. However, insofar as the data represent anything, the following table is what they show:




In 2011, the UK gained £102 billion of profits in total from its foreign direct investment, £58 billion more than was accrued by foreign direct investment in the UK, and the highest net earnings figure since 2008. Nice work if, as an imperial power, you can get it ...


Tony Norfield, 22 March 2013





Monday, 4 March 2013

A Private Chat About Provoking a War


The following text cites a conversation between a prominent British imperial politician and an American diplomat in London, in 1910. It is an interesting example of what key players say when they feel free to speak their mind. This was before Wikileaks, after all ...

"As Germany's industrial and financial power as well as its trade increased, a growing antagonism between Germany and the British Empire arose. Everywhere the ambitious German industry confronted a British competitor avidly observing the growing danger to his monopolistic trade relations, jealously guarded until then. A 1910 conversation between Lord Balfour, leader of the British Conservative Party, and Henry White, then United States Ambassador in London, shows the contrast between the two European industrial powers, and the attitude of the British leadership:

Balfour: We are probably fools not to find a reason for declaring war on Germany before she builds too many ships and takes away our trade.

White: You are a very high-minded man in private life. How can you possibly contemplate anything so politically immoral as provoking a war against a harmless nation which has as good a right to a navy as you have? If you wish to compete with German trade, work harder.

Balfour: That would mean lowering our standard of living. Perhaps it would be simpler for us to have a war.

White: I am shocked that you of all men should enunciate such principles.

Balfour: Is it a question of right or wrong? Maybe it is just a question of keeping our supremacy. "

(This text is from Georg Franz-Willing, ‘The origins of the Second World War’, Journal of Historical Review, Vol 7, Number 1, Spring 1986, p 97. The Balfour-White conversation was taken from a biography of Henry White) 


Tony Norfield, 4 March 2013

Saturday, 23 February 2013

Running Out of Rope


It is easy to dismiss the downgrading of the UK’s credit rating by Moody’s as yet another example of an agency stating the blindingly obvious. Indeed, so belated are such judgements that a Bloomberg report notes that bond markets ignore more than half of the agencies’ decisions on sovereign ratings.[1] Moody’s decision is an embarrassment for the UK Chancellor, oleaginous Osborne, as he promised to retain the coveted AAA status. It could also be a soundbite benefit for the opposition, but for the fact that their spokesmen cannot even pronounce the words ‘credit rating’ correctly. However, the significance of the decision is that it shows how the UK is running out of options to manage the crisis and that a more aggressive policy is likely.

Moody’s cited two related problems that result in a third: weak economic growth and high debt levels mean that the UK government is in a much worse position to manage further ‘shocks’.[2] Hence the downgrade. Moody’s assessment is that stagnant growth will hinder the reduction of the UK government debt, which it now expects will reach a level of 96% of GDP in 2016. This figure is high, but it would have been higher still had it not included the Treasury allocating to itself a surplus of some £35bn from the Bank of England’s emergency operations, and if it did not exclude the liabilities from the so-called ‘temporary’ financial interventions after 2007!

These latter items are extraordinary. The £35bn is the accumulated net interest from buying gilts that the Bank of England has gained from the Quantitative Easing programme. It has purchased a huge amount of government debt (£375bn) with monetary financing, got paid interest on the debt by the Treasury and then gave the interest back to the Treasury. This is a form of debt monetisation, one that is moderated only by the Bank of England buying debt in the secondary market and under a specific programme, rather than being open-ended, direct government financing by the central bank. As for the financial interventions to save the banking system, the ultimate scale of the liabilities is unclear, but, taking the cases of Lloyds and RBS, the UK government spent £66bn on their shares in a quasi-takeover. On the latest count it remains under water to the tune of £14bn just on the RBS holdings.

Moody’s analysis focuses on government debt because it is rating the UK government’s credit. However, it is well aware of the extreme levels of debt in the whole UK economy, levels that have also alarmed the Bank of England and underpin the widespread forecasts of stagnation. Some 280 people are declared bankrupt or insolvent every day in the UK, according to Credit Action data, while outstanding personal debt is close to the value of GDP and average debt per UK adult is £29,000, or 117% of average earnings.

The explosion of debt is a function both of the 2007-08 financial sector slump, and of the longer-term dependence of growth on credit expansion. Now the limits have been hit, more or less. This is the most important implication of the credit downgrade decision. Far from Moody’s assessment being an attack on government austerity policy, or endorsing more government spending to rescue the economy, as Labour party commentators like to imply, the agency makes very clear that a further credit downgrade would be in prospect if

“government policies were unable to stabilise and begin to ease the UK's debt burden during the multi-year fiscal consolidation programme. Moody's could also downgrade the UK's government debt rating further in the event of an additional material deterioration in the country's economic prospects or reduced political commitment to fiscal consolidation.”

The ratings change will likely have little effect on UK bond yields, at least in the immediate period. It is only a one-notch downgrade from the top rating by one agency, and similar downgrades of the US in 2011 and France in 2012 had no measurable impact – one that would indeed be difficult to measure, given the extraordinary crisis policies followed by all central banks. Furthermore, Moody’s points out that the UK is in a robust position in its debt financing, given its freedom in monetary policy and the relatively long maturity of its outstanding debt. So, the end is not nigh yet.

Neither is any abrupt UK policy change likely to follow from Moody’s downgrade. Instead, the background default policy remains as before: a remorseless squeeze on living standards. In the five years to early 2013, average weekly earnings rose by 9%, but retail prices (RPI measure) rose by 17.2%, resulting in a fall of 7% in real earnings. More of the same is in prospect, with a variety of price hikes in the pipeline and little effective resistance from workers.[3]

However, this squeeze is showing no sign of recreating conditions for renewed economic growth. This is not because austerity curbs demand, as Keynesians like to argue, but because conditions for profitable accumulation remain stubbornly absent. Boosting ‘demand’ through more government spending would only make the debt dynamics worse, yet limits on spending have obviously done little to encourage investment. By the third quarter of 2012, the volume of business investment had recovered somewhat from the trough of 2009, but it remained 8% lower than at the beginning of 2008. At the end of 2012, the GDP measure of output was still more than 3% below its level four years earlier. Official interest rates are the lowest on record, both in the UK and elsewhere, but the rates at which companies can borrow do not make investment attractive. Stagnation persists.

A striking fact is that while there have been many reports of cuts in government spending, and plans for more cuts in future years, the latest data to January 2013 show no reduction in central government spending on social benefits or other expenditure (outside debt interest). Nominal spending has risen roughly in line with inflation.[4] This suggests that the complaints over ‘cuts’ are more about the cuts that are in prospect, while the real austerity is yet to come.

With a desperate economic situation at home, it was no wonder that Prime Minister Cameron recently took the largest ever delegation of companies, more than 100, to India to tout for business. The main items up for sale were British military hardware, and Cameron extolled the virtues of the Eurofighter jet, partly built in Britain, over the decision India looks already to have made, to buy 126 French-made Rafale fighters in a multi-billion dollar deal. Aside from exports, Cameron also represented the interests of British companies that wanted to invest directly in the Indian domestic market, one that looks more promising than Europe in coming years.

Another policy that is ripe for conflict with other struggling powers concerns the exchange rate of sterling. Over recent months the Bank of England has continued to endorse a fall in the value of sterling on the foreign exchanges to ‘rebalance’ the economy. Since mid-December, sterling’s value has slumped by close to 7% versus both the euro and the US dollar. That will do little to boost exports in a world economy where output growth remains weak and where many other countries also toy with devaluation policies. However it is another point of tension, to complement the debates over Europe’s proposed financial transactions tax and other populist initiatives.


Tony Norfield, 23 February 2013


[1] Fergal O’Brien, ‘UK Loses Top Aaa Rating From Moody’s as Growth Weakens’, Bloomberg News 22 February 2013.
[2] “Moody's believes that the mounting debt levels in a low-growth environment have impaired the sovereign's ability to contain and quickly reverse the impact of adverse economic or financial shocks. For example, given the pace of deficit and debt reduction that Moody's has observed since 2010, there is a risk that the UK government may not be able to reverse the debt trajectory before the next economic shock or cyclical downturn in the economy.” The UK report is on their website: www.moodys.com
[3] Note that the Bank of England’s monetary policy committee is not bothered about ‘above target’ inflation when real earnings are falling and the rate of inflation has not (yet) become too embarrassing. This is especially when they are in no position to raise interest rates to curb inflation, as the old policy stance would have it, because of the still disastrous levels of debt.
[4] Total current central government expenditure rose by 6.3% year-on-year in January 2013, and for the period from April to January, the rise was 3.6%. ONS, Public Sector Finances, January 2013, Table PSF3A.

Wednesday, 26 December 2012

Churchill, Keynes, Gold & Empire – A Historical Vignette




Britain’s return to the gold standard in 1925 was a policy decision condemned famously in J M Keynes’s pamphlet of that year: ‘The economic consequences of Mr Churchill’. However, it is interesting to note that Keynes only argued against the particular rate chosen for sterling – one that was the same as in 1914 at the start of World War 1, when the gold standard had been suspended – not the decision itself. Furthermore, the rate was only claimed by Keynes to be about 10% too high, although this was significant for some of Britain’s industries, such as coal mining. But what is striking about Keynes’s pamphlet is that it completely ignores the actual reasons the government, with Winston Churchill as finance minister, took the decision. Instead, it presents a deceitful story about Churchill being ‘gravely misled by his experts’,[1] before discussing the national economic problems that would result.[2]

By contrast, the historian R S Sayers documents how the decision to go back on gold in 1925 had been very widely discussed. One of these discussions even took place at Keynes’s own house in London! Far from potential economic problems with the new gold parity being ignored, these were anticipated, but were thought to be worth paying in order to get the benefits of the decision to return to gold at the pre-war level.[3] The prevailing view, even of many industrialists, was that a return to gold in 1925 would have stabilised business conditions after the previous period of turmoil post-1918, and this would help to boost international trade and investment. However, my focus here is on the imperial rationale for Britain’s policy.

Keynes’s own biographer, Skidelsky, notes the imperial dimension, even though his subject does not. Skidelsky quotes from Churchill’s budget speech on 28 April 1925 when the decision to return to the gold standard at the pre-war rate was announced:

“If we had not taken this action, the whole of the rest of the British Empire would have taken it without us, and it would have come to a gold standard, not on the basis of the pound sterling, but a gold standard of the dollar.”[4]

What had happened was that the first imperialist war, usually called World War 1, was a major blow to Britain’s economic power. Wars are expensive, and Britain’s armed forces had previously been deployed mainly to put down small-scale threats from troublesome colonies and countries not making their coupon payments, not from rival powers that would take far more resources to subdue. (This is why the BBC Blackadder series showed that it was so difficult in trench warfare to move Field Marshall Haig’s drinks cabinet any further towards Berlin)[5] The commercial and financial orientation of the British economy was also severely damaged by war as trading and financial relations were disrupted. Hence, it was clear that Britain was in a weaker position after 1918, and its previous hegemony was endangered.

So, what could the British ruling class do? Could Britain’s previous power be restored? Despite the setbacks, there was reason to think so, given the desolation elsewhere in Europe, and despite the new worry about Soviet Russia that Britain had organised a multi-country invasion against. But the problem was that WW1 was largely a European war, and the US had emerged as a major world economic power. So, there was a debate in British policy circles. To restore sterling as the currency underpinning global financial relationships – at the old rate against gold, in order to stress both that nothing had really changed and that holders of sterling would not be damaged – my word is my bond. Or to recognise that the status quo ante was no longer attainable? In 1925, the former path was risky, but it looked far less of a threat to Britain’s imperial position and privileges than the latter.

This is what Churchill had to say that is relevant to my argument here when he made his April 1925 budget speech announcing the return to gold:[6]

“We are convinced that our financial position warrants a return to the gold standard under the conditions that I have described. We have accumulated a gold reserve of £153,000,000. That is the amount considered necessary by the Cunliffe Committee, and that gold reserve we shall use without hesitation, if necessary with the Bank Rate, in order to defend and sustain our new position.”
“I have only one observation to make on the merits. In our policy of returning to the gold standard we do not move alone. Indeed, I think we could not have afforded to remain stationary while so many others moved. The two greatest manufacturing countries in the world on either side of us, the United States and Germany, are in different ways either on or related to an international gold exchange. Sweden is on the gold exchange. Austria and Hungary are already based on gold, or on sterling, which is now the equivalent of gold. I have reason to know that Holland and the Dutch East Indies – very important factors in world finance – will act simultaneously with us today. As far as the British Empire is concerned – the self-governing Dominions – there will be complete unity of action. The Dominion of Canada is already on the gold standard. The Dominion of South Africa has given notice of her intention to revert to the old standard as from 1st July. I am authorised to inform the Committee that the Commonwealth of Australia, synchronising its action with ours, proposes from today to abolish the existing restrictions on the free export of gold, and that the Dominion of New Zealand will from today adopt the same course as ourselves in freely licensing the export of gold.”
“Thus over the wide area of the British Empire and over a very wide and important area of the world there, has been established at once one uniform standard of value to which all international transactions are related and can be referred. That standard may, of course, vary in itself from time to time, but the position of all the countries related to it will vary together, like ships in a harbour whose gangways are joined and who rise and fall together with the tide. I believe that the establishment of this great area of common arrangement will facilitate the revival of international trade and of inter-Imperial trade. Such a revival and such a foundation is important to all countries and to no country is it more important than to this island, whose population is larger than its agriculture or its industry can sustain, which is the centre of a wide Empire, and which, in spite of all its burdens, has still retained, if not the primacy, at any rate the central position, in the financial systems of the world.”

Not for first time, nor the last, Churchill’s priority was the promotion of Britain’s imperialist interests. However, his was not the view of a politician who did not care about the national economy. Instead he saw what made the national economy tick when it so clearly depended upon having a ‘central position’ in global finance.

Keynes was hardly blind to British imperialism’s interests; among other things he had previously spent time as one of its civil servants in India. However, his ‘national economy’ focus on the question of returning to gold completely misconstrued how the world economy worked. This remains all too true for Keynes’s followers today.

The lesson for us all from this historical vignette is that big events cannot be understood if we do not take into account the reality of an imperialist world economy. The importance of a concept can be shown by how the analysis of events fails in its absence. This is particularly true for the concept of imperialism today. If major events can only properly be understood by examining these relationships and dynamics, then any analysis that fails to take these into account will have at best a partial perspective, but, more likely, a completely mistaken one.


Tony Norfield

26 December 2012



[1] See The Collected Writings of J M Keynes, Volume IX, Essays in Persuasion, Cambridge University Press, 1984, p212.
[2] See the Sayers article noted next for the many contingencies of the time. These question how far a different rate for sterling would have made any significant difference to the later 1931 UK exit from, and general break up of, the gold standard system.
[3] R S Sayers, ‘The Return to Gold’ in Sidney Pollard (ed), The Gold Standard and Employment Policies Between the Wars, Methuen 1970.
[4] Robert Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes: The Economist As Saviour, 1920-1937, Macmillan, London, 1992, p200.
[5] The TV series joke was that many tens of thousands died going ‘over the top’ from the trenches to bring about an advance of six inches. The fact that many trenches were dug by Chinese workers – acting as labourers, with no military protection - was never mentioned in the Blackadder series.

Sunday, 4 November 2012

Union Jacked


War is a continuation of politics by other means, and politics is concentrated economics. That is why the history of British military attacks on other countries is long and bloody. In recent years, under Prime Minister Tony Blair (1997-2007) the UK bombed, attacked or invaded Yugoslavia, Iraq (twice), Sierra Leone and Afghanistan. Gordon Brown continued the policy, as did David Cameron, whose government added Libya. But a new book by Stuart Laycock, All the Countries We've Ever Invaded: And the Few We Never Got Round To,[1] does an interesting job of documenting the longer history. It points out that there are only 22 countries out of nearly 200 in the world that Britain has abstained from. That short list would be shorter still if it included covert operations, the support of ‘rebels’ and economic sanctions.


Tony Norfield, 4 November 2012